Fourth District, Division One Publishes FDIC v. Dintino. In our September 9, 2008 post, we reviewed the decision of FDIC v. Dintino. The decision held that success on noncontractual claims should not be considered when determining “prevailing party” status under Civil Code section 1717, but also indicated that work may frequently […]
Second District So Holds in Published Decision Relating to an Inadmissible Settlement Agreement: Civil Code section 1717 Does Not Trump the Mediation Privilege. As framed by the Second District, Division Four, the attorney’s fees portion of the case involved a question of first impression—whether attorney’s fees are recoverable under Civil Code
Second District, Division Eight Reverses Lower Court Determination Denying Fee Based on Limited Scope of Fees Clause. In enacting Civil Code section 1717, the Legislature made it abundantly clear that mutuality principles are to govern interpretation of attorney’s fees clauses such that unilaterally worded provisions are construed as reciprocal in nature.
Fourth District, Division One So Rules in Interpreting Civil Code section 1717 and Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The next case is a nice refresher on Civil Code section 1717 “prevailing party” principles and on clarity requirements for Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offers. (For more case discussion, see
Fourth District, Division Two Holds Successor Bound By Fee Clause in Loan Documents. In this interesting time of economic woes, there are many persons who “assume” loans from borrowers without lender consent. Not only can this practice likely trigger “due on sale” clauses, it also may expose the successor borrower to
Fifth District, in an Unpublished Opinion, Rejects Reasoning From Both Abdallah and International Billing Services in Affirming Lower Court Fee Denial. In our four months of blogging, we have covered both published and unpublished California appellate decisions. We have found that the unpublished decisions are still valuable for their analysis, although
Second District, Division One Affirms and Reverses Portions of Fee Award Under Contractual Provision and Discretionary Fee-Shifting Statutes. By now, it should be apparent that there are stark differences in how some fee-shifting statutes operate. Civil Code section 1717 mandates an award to a "prevailing party" under a contractual fees clause,
Fourth District, Division One Reverses Fee Denial Based on Hsu v. Abbara. We survey unpublished decisions because they frequently reinforce distinctions that get lost in translation because of the diffuse opinions on the “prevailing party” concept in California attorney’s fees award jurisprudence. The next case reminds us that the “prevailing party”
Declaratory Relief Count Never Dismissed Was Proper Anchor for Fee Award. Contractual fee clauses certainly shift the risks in civil litigation. Civil Code section 1717 is a legislative embodiment of that policy, going so far as to make sure that unilateral fee clauses are construed as being mutual in nature. The
Division Eight Refuses to Follow Manier’s “Allegations Alone Suffice” Estoppel Theory. In a wild case involving contentions of contract formation, untimely acceptance, and a critically forged document, the Second District, Division Eight affirmed a trial court’s equitable rulings but modified a judgment to delete an attorney’s fees award against a nonsignatory
