Former Sheriff Had Authority To Select, Not To Retain, Independent Counsel To Represent Him In Writ Petition Filed By County To Challenge Villanueva’s Authority To Settle A Civil Lawsuit Filed By A Terminated Deputy.
When the County of Los Angeles sued former Los Angeles Sheriff Alex Villanueva and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to challenge Sheriff’s authority and directive in settling a civil lawsuit filed by a terminated deputy, Sheriff was advised that the Board of Supervisors would provide independent legal counsel for the case because of County’s conflict of interest. Sheriff was also advised that he was allowed to “select” his independent counsel, but that the Board had discretion to pay Sheriff’s independent counsel as it deemed just and proper.
Sheriff selected the Quinn law firm, and signed an engagement agreement a few weeks after the firm began actively representing him and the LACSD. The agreement, which was not provided to the Board or to County, included hourly billing rates ranging from $695 to $1,400.
Quinn relied upon the agreement entered into by Sheriff – refusing to sign the retainer agreement containing a blended hourly rate of $495, plus “standard billing requirements and terms and conditions [the county] requires of all contracted law firms” that was sent to it by County Counsel around the same time.
Quinn eventually sent Sheriff invoices totaling $1,740,001.70, but they were not paid as County’s position was that Quinn did not have a valid agreement by which it represented Sheriff and the Sheriff’s Department. Ultimately, the dispute found its way to court, with the lower court ruling in County’s favor – determining that there had been no delegation of authority to Sheriff to enter into the engagement letter. Quinn fared no better on appeal.
In County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Case Nos. B331562/B338936 (2d Dist., Div. 8 October 23, 2025) (published), the 2/8 DCA affirmed the trial court’s finding – that the engagement letter entered into between Quinn and Sheriff was void. As Quinn had been previously advised by County Counsel, the Board was authorized to employ legal counsel to assist Sheriff, pursuant to Gov. Code § 31000.6(a), in any case where County Counsel would have a conflict of interest, such as here. Under Board Policy No. 20.170, the Board had delegated solely to County Counsel its authority to enter into a contract for legal services provided to the County, its elected officials, agent, and employees. (Gov. Code §§ 23005 and 31000.) Because the Board never delegated such authority to Sheriff, the engagement letter was unenforceable, and Quinn was presumptively charged with full knowledge of Sheriff’s powers and authority to bind County to the engagement letter. (G.L. Mezzetta, Inc. v. City of American Canyon (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1092; Katsura v. City of San Buenaventura (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 104, 109.)