Second District, Division 4 Found No Error In Severely Reducing Lodestar And Not Applying a Multiplier. After plaintiff settled with several defendants for $100,000 on FEHA claims, the trial court then had to determine the fee recovery to plaintiff’s counsel. Three attorneys requested a total of $564,344.38 in fees (based on a 1.5 multiplier) […]
Second District, Division 8 Affirms $84,500 Fee Award to Prevailing Plaintiff in CLRA Action. After two appeals, plaintiff finally has won finality with respect to a $84,500 fee award entered in his favor under the CLRA after winning a battle against a Porsche Turbo Coupe seller for a refund because the car needed various repairs.
Second District, Division 6 Affirms $125,290 Fee Award in Action Where Plaintiff Settled For $126,000 on Various Counts. Settlement agreements are generally enforced by their terms, especially where they involve enforcement of public policy fee-shifting statutes. The next case demonstrates this principle very well. In Rodriguez v. Victoria Ventura Health Care LLC, Case
Both Sides Appealed the Fee Award, But The Trial Court’s Award Stood Firm. The Ralph Act (Civil Code, § 51.7) provides that all persons within California’s jurisdiction have the right to be free from violence or intimidation because of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status or sexual orientation
Court of Appeal Also Rejects Asymmetrical Interpretation of Fee-Shifting Provision. The next case, Alarcon v. Fireside Bank, Case Nos. A117148 & A118566 (1st Dist., Div. 3 Mar. 8, 2010) (unpublished), pitted two different statutes against each other, both contained in the Rees-Levering Automobile and Sales Finance Act (ASFA), Civil Code section 2981 et
Plaintiff Only Won $55,000 Jury Verdict Plus $18,000 in Costs. Although awards to winning plaintiffs under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act are encouraged, they must be reasonable in amount. Otherwise, the trial court has broad discretion to deny them in entirety or substantially chop them down from their higher requests. The next
First District, Division 1 Rejects State’s Challenges to Amount of Fee Award. In an earlier appeal, certain plaintiffs successfully enjoined enforcement of certain legislation allowing for incarceration for drug-related probations violations because such a sanction was inconsistent with Proposition 36 (the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000). Plaintiffs also successfully defended
Court Discusses Substantive Fee Shifting Statute, Lodestar Factors, and Non-Cost Expense Reimbursement Issues in Recent Decision. EEOC v. Boot, Case No. 07-CV-95-LLR (N.D. Iowa Feb. 9, 2010 Order), is an unusual decision where a United States district judge awarded $4,560,285.11 in fees and costs (broken down as $4,004,371.65 in fees, $463,071.25 in “non-cost”
In our January 19, 2010 post, we examined Chacon v. Litke, Case Nos. A122026 & A123889 (1st Dist., Div. 2 published Feb. 8, 2010), which was unpublished at the time. This decision established that the lodestar analysis was the presumptive method for gauging special fee-shifting provisions, including those enacted under governmental ordinances. On
Lodestar Is the Standard, and Attorney Still Entitled to Lodestar Fees Even Where Client Agreement Was Below Market or Discounted in Nature. The lodestar method is the one used most often by trial courts in awarding both attorney’s fees under contractual provisions and fee-shifting statutes. What about county ordinances containing fee-shifting sections? Answer: lodestar also.
