Second District, Division Six Modifies Fee Award Made Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 527.6(i). Where statutory directives are clear, a de novo issue of law is presented for the appellate court’s determination. That was the situation in the next case we discuss. Code of Civil […]
Fourth District, Division Three Rules the Offer in Uncertain in an Unpublished Opinion. One of the practice treatises used by many California practitioners has a sample Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, which is a cost-shifting mechanism designed to encourage settlement and to penalize a party who fails to accept
Second District Does Place Restrictions On Activities For Which Neutral Stakeholder Can Seek Fee Reimbursement. Code of Civil Procedure section 386.6(a) provides that a party to a properly commenced interpleader action “may insert is his motion, petition, complaint, or cross complaint a request for allowance of his costs and reasonable attorney
District Judge Hamilton Approves Settlement On August 13, 2008. On March 31, 2005, certain women, individually and on behalf of a putative class, filed a lawsuit in United States District Court, Northern District of California, seeking monetary, injunctive and other relief against Smith Barney because of alleged gender discrimination. The lawsuit,
Fourth District, Division Three Overturns Denial and Analyzes anti-SLAPP Fee Issues in the Process. In the following case, we have an entertaining decision penned by Presiding Justice Sills on behalf of a Fourth District, Division Three unanimous panel. However, it also has a very syllogistic-like analysis of issues frequently encountered in
Second District, Division Eight Dismisses Appeal of Fee Motion Denial for Lack of Jurisdiction, Reminding Us That A Fee Determination Is Only Appealable After Entry of An Appealable Order or Judgment. Increasingly, appellate courts have become less lenient for litigants’/practitioners’ failures to appeal from appealable orders or judgments. For example, no
Yes, With the Answer Depending on Whether the Fee Entitlement Statute Is Discretionary/Mandatory in Nature or Whether the Intervenor Is “Innocent.” The Ninth Circuit recently explored the issue of when an intervenor may be held liable for an award of attorney’s fees and costs under two fee-shifting statutes, one arising under
Fourth District, Division One Reverses Lower Court Fee Grant to Plaintiff. Previously, in our July 21, 2008 post on The Right Site Coalition (an unpublished reversal), we discussed Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the private attorney general fee provision. Section 1021.5 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees if (1) plaintiff’s
No Express Findings Are Required When Denying a Fee Award to a Winning FEHA Defendant.
Fourth District, Division Three Affirms Denial of Fees Where Dismissal Predicated On Discovery Terminating Sanctions. In our past post of May 28, 2008 on the unpublished decision of Optimal Water, Inc. v. Robbins, we discussed Corporations Code section 317, which provides for indemnification of corporate agents by corporations under specified circumstances.
