Second District, Division 2 Nixes Primary Trope Challenge On Appeal. Here is an interesting one to add to the Trope jurisprudence, although it is unpublished in nature. The end result is that a general manager of a represented client likely is analogous to an in-house counsel lacking the personal interest to disqualify the manager’s […]
First District, Division 2 Panel Has Very Divergent Perspectives on Breadth of Fee Clause. Here is a very interesting unpublished decision about the interpretation of a CAR form fee clause in a brokerage contract. The main dispute centered upon the interpretation of the scope of this provision: “In any action, proceeding or arbitration
In our April 24, 2010 post, we reported on Lockton v. O’Rourke, an interesting Second District, Division 4 unpublished decision on how Trope v. Katz operates in the context of a broadly worded fees clause. Well, we can now report that the appellate panel ordered Lockton published on May 10, 2010. It is now
Second District, Division 2 Does Reverse Section 1717 Award To Nonsuing Partnership. Here is an interesting case litigated on appeal by a former Second District jurist that shows how the absence of the requirement of a statement of decision can impede an appeal, in tandem with a failure to specifically document the error. The
Third District Reverses Nonsignatory Segment of Award, But Affirms Signatory Component. The next case was a mixed result for a defendant/cross-complainant, showing how Civil Code section 1717 operates when there are separate contracts—some with fee clauses and some without. The same party can avoid fees but also get stung with fees, depending on
Second District, Division 4 So Holds, Noting No Decisions On Point. We have examined numerous cases that have denied an award of attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1717 because of the limitation set forth in Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal.4th 274 (1995), holding that in pro per attorneys representing themselves cannot obtain fee
Fourth District, Division 3 Opinion Demonstrates Interplay Between De Novo and Abuse of Discretion Review Standards on Different Fee Award Issues. The next case shows how a litigant may convince an appellate court that legal error was committed (de novo review of a fee entitlement issue), but the battle for reversal is lost
Second District, Division 6 Also Holds Fees Do Not Have To Be Apportioned. Broad contractual language allowing for fee recovery “in any lawsuit or other legal proceeding to which this Agreement gives” can even grant entitlement to fee recovery with respect to tort claims. (Xuereb v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 3 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1342-1343
Founding Shareholder Representing Law Firm Was Disqualified From Fee Recovery. Although Civil Code section 1717 is one of the better known fee-shifting statutes, there are restrictions to it. One such restriction pertains to attorneys who elect to represent themselves, with Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal.4th 274, 277 (1995) establishing that an attorney representing himself
If one side does not win a clear victory in a case (such as nominal damages), the lower court can certainly award fees to the other side where it beat major exposure on claims involving a fee-shifting clause. That is exactly what happened in the next case we explore. In Core Wealth Mgt.,
