Fourth District, Division 3 Puts Decision “In the Books.” In our September 30, 2010 post, we discussed Hyduke’s Valley Motors v. Lobel Financial Corp., Case No. G042816 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 29, 2010), which found no Civil Code section fee recovery was allowable to a plaintiff used car dealer because it did not […]
Second District, Division 2 Finds Settlement Stipulation Allowed for 1717 Fee Recovery. In Duenas v. Fraccionamiento Villas Del Mar, S.A., Case No. B219112 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Sept. 30, 2010) (unpublished), parties to a Baja California condominium dispute settled, reached a stipulation that all issues but a note payment issue in favor of plaintiff—including
Affirms $289,000 Costs Award and $1.6 Million Fee Award. In a long-running case that has produced several appellate opinions along the way, V3I v. Western Digital Corp., Case No. G041386 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 29, 2010) (unpublished) finally ran its course, with the final appeal being from a $289,000 costs award and
Fourth District, Division 3 So Holds in Wholesale Used Car Dealer Dispute. In Hyduke’s Valley Motors v. Lobel Financial Corp., Case No. G042816 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Sept. 29, 2010) (unpublished), plaintiff (a wholesale used car dealer) won money due to it from a second car dealer that refused to pay for vehicles sold
Second District, Division 1 Affirms and Remands to Award Fees on Appeal. Levaton v. Levaton, Case No. B213730 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Sept. 24, 2010) (unpublished) involved a family real estate deal gone bust, with the trial court ultimately awarding one side rescission. An initial appeal affirmed most of the judgment, but remanded to
Second District, Division 4 Orders Denial of Motion to Tax Costs. Civil Code section 1717 applies to fee award requests, not an award of routine costs. If a memorandum of costs itemizes routine costs authorized by statute (such as filing fees, process service fees, and exhibit copying expenses), the burden is on the
Second District, Division 4 Nixes Appellant’s Reliance on Parsed Language from Butler-Rupp. In Sherwyn v. Nathaniel, Case No. B215666 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Sept. 1, 2010) (unpublished), defendant defensed plaintiff attorney in a jury trial involving attorney’s effort to collect unpaid fees that were claimed to be owed for a prior divorce representation
Fourth District, Division 3 Does Not Buy “Reverse Bootstrap” Theory Under Section 1717. (Excerpted from photo in Wikipedia article on “Bootstrapping”) One cannot ignore the reciprocity principle underlying Civil Code section 1717, which makes a unilateral contractual fee-shifting clause mutual in nature—and does so in a variety of circumstances. For example, there are
The next case is more important for construction practitioners dealing with Coleman-related compensation issues where the good faith negotiations between the parties do not result in any agreement on price. However, it also shows you that our Mission Statement is still very prophetic—attorney’s fees awards may be the tail that truly wags (and awards
Reciprocity Principle Underlying Section 1717 Required Reversal of Fee Denial. Here is a decision emphasizing that Civil Code section 1717 reciprocity principles will prevail, even where a successful litigant shows that the contract (in this case, CC&Rs) was inapplicable. The fees clause had to be construed as mutual in nature. The lower court did
