Defendant Lacked Standing For The Initial Fee Motion It Brought – Nullifying The Order Granting The Motion And Each Subsequent Order Based On Plaintiff’s Failure To Comply With Void Initial Fee Order
After being fired by Plaintiff trustee, Defendant law firm successfully brought a motion for fees under Probate Code § 17200. When trustee failed to comply with the lower court’s fee order, law firm moved to have him declared to be in contempt of court, and for additional attorney fees incurred in its enforcement efforts – which the lower court granted. Trustee did not file an appeal of either of the fee orders. Instead, after the second fee order, Trustee filed with the lower court a motion to vacate on the basis that law firm lacked standing to bring a fee motion under section 17200, which is limited to trustees and beneficiaries. When the lower court denied the motion to vacate, Trustee took his lack of standing argument to the 2/1 DCA in Vogel v. Vogt, Resnick & Sherak, LLP, Case No. B341968 (2d Dist., Div. 1 October 27, 2025) (unpublished).
For its part, Defendant argued on appeal that it had standing to bring the motion as an interested person – relying on the holding in Hamlin v. Jendayi (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1064, that nothing in section 17200 prohibits a probate court from conferring standing on persons other than trustees and beneficiaries who assert property rights or claims against a trust estate.
The 2/1 DCA disagreed with Defendant’s contention and reversed – concluding that the initial fee order was void, along with subsequent orders based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the void initial order, because Defendant did not have standing to bring the initial fee motion. Although Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822 and Hamlin have expanded the scope of “trustee or beneficiary of a trust” under section 17200, that expansion did not include any creditor using the section 17200 process. The Legislature, if it had intended for attorneys who formerly represented a trustee to have the right to petition for fees, would have included explicit language to that effect. For example, Prob. Code, § 10830(a)(2) allows for an “attorney for the personal representative [of a decedent’s estate]” to file a petition for fees.
Because the appellate panel found that Defendant lacked standing, the typical rule that the denial of a motion to vacate is not appealable did not apply here. Arguments based on a lack of standing involve jurisdictional challenges that may be raised at any time in the proceeding. Where a lack of standing has been determined, the order denying the motion to vacate becomes “ ‘void and appealable because it gives effect to a void judgment.’ ” (311 6 South Spring Street Co. v. Department of General Services, (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1014.)
Additionally, the appellate panel affirmed a $990 sanctions award issued against Plaintiff, under Code Civ. Proc. § 177.5, for failing to appear in court and file a timely response to the lower court’s order to show cause.