Fourth District, Division Three Rejects Hitting Husband With Six Figure Sanction and Commends Lower Court for Its Restraint.
Family Code section 271’s sanctions has been discussed in several previous posts: July 8, 2008—In re Marriage of MacIntyre and In re Marriage of Falcon & Fyke and July 17, 2008—In re Marriage of Thomas & Giffin. In brief summary, section 271 allows a trial court discretion to award attorney’s fees and costs as sanctions to a party that fails to promote settlement and fails to cooperate in dissolution proceedings, making sure the sanction does not impose an unreasonable financial burden against the sanctioned party.
In In re Marriage of Hipp, Case No. G038130 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Aug. 27, 2008) (unpublished), Justice Ikola—writing for a 3-0 panel of our local Santa Ana-based Court of Appeal—affirmed a $15,000 section 271 sanction against Wife. In a twist from the usual setting, Husband appealed the sanction in his favor, arguing that Wife should have been hit with a $1.5 million sanction ($500,000 in fees/costs and an extra $1 million “punitive” award). He cited to two decisions where sanctions of $250,000 and $100,000 were imposed. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Feldman, 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1482-1483 (2007); In re Marriage of Quay, 18 Cal.App.4th 961, 970-971 (1993).
The problem is that Wife took the right approach on appeal, led by veteran appellate/dissolution specialists Marjorie G. Fuller and John R. Schilling. Wife conceded her wrongdoing and did not appeal from the sanctions determination. Justice Ikola, on behalf of the appellate panel, determined there was no abuse of discretion, especially because section 271 does not require full compensation for all fees and costs expended (In re Marriage of Battenburg, 28 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1346 (1994)), much less the extra $1 million Husband requested as a “punitive” add-on. In a nice “hat tip” to the lower court (Orange County Superior Judge Derek W. Hunt), Justice Ikola wrote: “Sanctions of only $15,000 may have been merciful, given [Wife’s] intransigence, but that is a commendable judicial trait.”