This next opinion, Karr v. Statewide Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 245147 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Aug. 23, 2013) (unpublished), has two interesting points: (1) a motion to vacate a summary judgment was not “on the contract” for Civil Code section 1717 fee recovery purposes given the existence of a narrow fees clause in a settlement agreement only extending to actions to “enforce or interpret” the agreement; and (2) lawyers need to be candid with lower courts by announcing important events like a settlement rather than allowing a judge to enter an unopposed summary judgment which had to be vacated due to the settlement.
What happened is defense counsel allowed a summary judgment motion to go to judgment even though a settlement had been reached by the plaintiff. At the hearing, defense counsel did not point out that a settlement had been reached. Defense counsel even submitted a proposed judgment after a dismissal had been filed in line with the settlement. Later, plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment, a motion which was granted given that the summary judgment hearing should have been taken off calendar.
Above: Temple of Justice. James Trenchard. 1788. Library of Congress.
The appellate court was not happy with defense counsel’s conduct, quoting from Morrow v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1261-1262 (1994): “[An attorney] is an officer of the court–a minister in the temple of justice. His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions.” The opinion was sent to the State Bar for consideration of discipline.
Justice Chaney penned the 3-0 decision on Division 1’s behalf.
