Lower Court Erred By Not Entering The Entire Dismissal, Which Triggered The Santisas Bar For An Award Of Civil Code Section 1717 Fees.
In Shayan v. Shakib, Case No. B337559 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Aug. 27, 2026) (unpublished), plaintiff sued defendant under various loan transactions having promissory notes with prevailing party, contractual fee clauses. After some law-and-motion proceedings, defendant eventually jettisoned a guaranty cause of action in multiple complaints which were the subject of consolidated lawsuits. Because plaintiff reached a settlement, plaintiff attempted to voluntarily dismiss the entire actions, with the clerk honoring those requests but with the lower court not doing so in a judgment which was entered based on a defense request. The lower court then awarded prevailing party attorney’s fees to defendant. Plaintiff appellant appealed, obtaining a reversal of the refusal to enter the voluntarily dismissals, which also resulted in a reversal as a matter of law of the attorney’s fees award. Because the voluntarily dismissals were proper, the Civil Code section 1717 bar meant that fees were not justified. (Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal.4th 599, 617 (1998); Gogri v. Jack in the Box Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 255, 273-274 (2008).) Respondent defendant argued that section 1717 extended to a cause of action or a claim, but the appellate court rejected that based on section 1717’s “action” language and the legal precedents indicating that the dismissals/fee bar was justified.