Becerra’s Successful Defense Resulted In A Published Decision Enforcing An Important Public Right And Conferring A Significant Benefit On The General Public, And Becerra’s Personal Financial Burden Incurred In Defeating The Petition Outweighed Any Pecuniary Benefit Becerra Might Have Received If He Won The Election.
Plaintiff Eric P. Early (and his election committee) filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to remove Xavier Becerra as a candidate for Attorney General on the November 2018 ballot on the basis that Becerra was ineligible because he had not practiced during the five years preceding the election, and was not “admitted to practice” as required under Gov. Code § 12503. Becerra (and his election committee) defeated Early’s petition – a result that the Third District affirmed on appeal in a published opinion that stated for the first time that Gov. Code § 12503 does not require active or actual practice of law, thereby expanding the pool of eligible candidates for Attorney General, for example, to include members of the state bar who had voluntarily taken inactive status while serving in other public office. (Early v. Becerra, 47 Cal.App.5th 325, 329 (2020).)
After defeating Early’s petition, Becerra successfully moved for Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5 attorney fees – obtaining a fee award of $69,718 from the trial court in Early v. Becerra, Case No. C089943 (3d Dist., February 8, 2021) (published). Early appealed and the Third District affirmed.
Becerra’s successful defense of Early’s petition enforced an important public right and conferred a significant benefit on the general public – resulting in a published decision that put to rest a challenge to the eligibility of a candidate for Attorney General under § 12503, which had twice been mounted against Attorney General candidates, with a claimed disqualification being only that the candidates were “admitted to practice” but “inactive” while serving in other public office.
Additionally, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the financial burden Becerra personally incurred in defending Early’s petition outweighed any pecuniary benefit Becerra might have received in the form of the salary paid to the Attorney General or otherwise. After all, Becerra’s successful defense did not guarantee that he would be elected and gain the pecuniary benefits associated with being Attorney General – only that his name remained on the ballot. (Boatworks, LLC v. City of Alameda, 35 Cal.App.5th 290, 310 (2019) [discussed in our June 13, 2019 post].
Finally, the panel found no abuse of discretion in the amount of fees awarded, and disagreed with Early’s contention that the trial court should have stricken the entirety of Becerra’s fees-on-fees request (fees incurred in bringing a fee motion), rather than only half, based on the trial court’s finding that time spent on Becerra’s fees motion was excessive and unreasonable in part. Citing Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (1977) [our Leading Case No. 3], the panel held that “[t]he ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ”