Second District, Division Six Modifies Fee Award Made Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 527.6(i).
Where statutory directives are clear, a de novo issue of law is presented for the appellate court’s determination. That was the situation in the next case we discuss.
Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 is the statutory scheme allowing a person suffering harassment to obtain a prohibitory temporary restraining order and subsequent injunction. Section 527.6(i) states: “The prevailing party in any action brought under this section may be awarded court costs and attorney’s fees, if any.” However, that directive was not followed in Dykstra v. Jones, Case No. B198079 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Aug. 21, 2008) (unpublished).
There, Mr. Dykstra lost an injunction request against Lindsay Jones, an ex-business partner who was claimed to have been harassing Dykstra’s employees. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees of $3,800 to be paid by Mr. Dykstra, but subsequently ordered them paid to Jones’ attorney (rather than Jones directly) over Dykstra’s objection.
On appeal, the Second District, Division Six affirmed the fees award but modified the award to direct payment to Jones as the “prevailing party.” Because section 527.6(i) was facially clear, the trial court erred by awarding payment to Jones’ attorney rather than Jones directly (citing City of Los Angeles v. Knapp, 7 Cal.2d 168, 173 (1936)). The fee award was corrected, and Jones was assessed with costs on appeal.