General Ability To Pay Findings Were Not Sufficient.
In Manning v. Manning, Case No. D084718 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Nov. 12, 2025) (unpublished), a contentious divorce case with lots of activity, a lower court—mainly out of frustration—denied ex-wife’s request for a Family Code section 2030 fee award of $200,000 for fees and $50,000 in expert witness costs even though both ex-spouses ran up multiple six figures in fees and presented divergent financial resource evidence, even though ex-husband was by far the more asset-worthy party. The lower court acknowledged as much, but denied ex-wife’s fee request based on her past litigation conduct and not making clear explicit rulings—as required—on disparity of access and propriety of a fee award elements required under section 2030. The 4/1 DCA reversed and remanded, finding that the “ability to pay subcomponents,” mandated findings were inadequate and that reliance on past litigation misconduct was irrelevant with respect to fees when it came to future proceedings. This case goes on, but it does illustrate how dissolution cases are expensive on fees/costs as well as emotions for the parties—with courts generally receptive to give section 2030 fees to the less well-heeled party.