CCP Section 1021.5: Airport Operations Officer Does Not Obtain Private Attorney General Statutory Fees Because Focus of Action Was On Advancement of His Own Personal Interests

Second District, Division Six Also Determines No Fees Awardable Under Government Code section 800.

     In County of Ventura v. Ventura County Prof. Peace Officers Assn., Case No. B204907 (Nov. 20, 2008) (unpublished), real party in interest was reinstated as an airport operations officers pursuant to an arbitration award, which was then vacated by the superior court. Real party, through his peace officers association, appealed and won a reversal of the decision to vacate the arbitration award. Having secured that victory, real party then argued he was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under either Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 or Government Code section 800.

     Not so, said the Second District, Division Six, in a 3-0 opinion authored by Justice Coffee.

     With respect to fees awardable under section 1021.5, the confirmation of the arbitration award did not confer a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons; rather, it only advanced real party’s personal interests. (Flannery v. California Highway Patrol, 61 Cal.App.4^th 629, 635 (1998).) Thus, no fees were authorized under the private attorney general statute. (BLOG OBSERVATION—This result is consistent with other opinions we have reviewed in the past; see September 16, 2008 post on Brumbaugh v. City of Torrance and November 2, 2008 post on Martin v. City and Council of San Francisco).

     The fee issue under Government Code section 800 was a little trickier, but still did not avail real party. Section 800 allows a litigant who successfully challenges an administrative agency’s determination to recover attorney’s fees if the litigant demonstrates that the public agencies’ decision was arbitrary or capricious. After observing that “we have found no case applying Government Code section 800 to award fees to a party who obtains confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award against a public agency,” the appellate panel concluded the County’s actions were not capricious or arbitrary so as to justify a fee award in real party’s favor. (Slip Opn., at pp. 10-11.)