Second District, Division 1 Clarifies that Maughan Did Not Establish a 50 Hour Definitive “Upper Limit” for Compensable SLAPP Motion Work. In Stark v. Withrow, Case No. B214957 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Apr. 26, 2010) (unpublished), the Second District, Division 1 affirmed a $15,000 fee award (out of a requested $35,382.37) in favor […]
Remand Also Ordered For Purposes of Awarding Appellate Defense Fees. In Mendoza v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc., Case No. B214653 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Mar. 23, 2010) (certified for publication), the appellate court considered the collision of Megan’s Law and the SLAPP statute. Specifically, Megan’s Law has a provision prohibiting use
First District, Division 2 Finds No Statement of Decision Required on Fee Ruling and that Lodestar Rates For Out-of-County Counsel Could Indeed Be Higher. By now, most of you readers know that the anti-SLAPP statute has a mandatory fee-shifting statute in favor of prevailing defendants. That means the issue generally devolves to how much,
Second District, Division 4 Agrees that Attorney Representing His Own Interests Cannot Recoup SLAPP Fees. Attorneys representing themselves in successful anti-SLAPP motions are not entitled to recover attorney’s fees because there are no attorney-client relationships that lead to the attorney paying or becoming liable to pay in consideration for the legal representation. (Taheri Law
First District, Division 1 Does Reject That Insurance Defense Counsel Cannot Seek Fee Recovery. In Roeder v. Gardner, Case No. A123864 (1st Dist., Div. 1 Feb. 22, 2010) (unpublished), defendant—through insurance defense counsel—obtained an anti-SLAPP strike of four causes of action out of eight. The trial court awarded $9,325 in mandatory attorney’s fees and
Second District, Division 1 Rules Plaintiff’s Mandate Challenge to Compel City To Award a Contract Through Competitive Bidding Not Subject to anti-SLAPP Statute. City of Pico Rivera likely felt pretty good after SLAPPing a plaintiff business’s mandate challenge to City’s invalidation of a contract with plaintiff and reentry into a contract with one of
Trope Prohibition Did Not Apply. Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal.4th 274, 292 (1995) can strike fears into the heart of litigators winning hard fought battles for their own interests—it held that a law firm that is represented in litigation by its member attorneys cannot recover attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 1717. Trope has
Part 1 of 2: First Ten Grouping—Nos. 11-20. As noted in an earlier post, we have accumulated our “top 20” attorney’s fees decisions, recognizing that we limit the list to published decisions and that the order reflects nothing about the importance of the decision. Rather, we try to survey decisions of interest in different
First District, Division 3 Reverses Fee Award. As we have seen in cases reviewed in our category “SLAPP,” prevailing defendants on SLAPP motions are entitled to mandatory reasonable attorney’s fees. However, plaintiffs can get them if the court finds that the defendant’s SLAPP motion was frivolous or intended for dilatory purposes. Code Civ. Proc.,
Second District Determines SLAPP Ruling Does Determine Amount of Motion to Strike Fees, But Remaining Attorney’s Fees Are Fair Game and Defendant Bears Burden of Allocating Out Unreasonable Fees. The next decision is an interesting one that we predict will have more and more play as SLAPP motions and later malicious prosecution awards interact in
