“Pocketbook” Was the Dispositive Factor in this One. In a FEHA lawsuit, a prevailing defendant is only entitled to an attorney’s fees award upon a finding that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, with lower courts instructed to refrain from use of post hoc reasoning that translates a loss of the
Another Mortal Kombat Fatality Looming in Video Game Litigation? Fresh from killing the ban on children’s access to violent video games in California, the legal team advocating First Amendment rights for the video industry may taste more blood with a fee motion to the United States Supreme Court. The motion seeks $1,144,602.64 from California,
Suggestions for Maximizing Fee Recovery Under “But For” Standard Pertaining to Prevailing Public Entities in Civil Rights Cases In a July 22, 2011 post at PublicCEO.com, attorneys Gerry Knapton and Kim Karelis discuss the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Fox v. Vice, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4182 (U.S. June 6, 2011), where a “but
First District, Division 4 Adds to State False Claims Act Fee Shifting Jurisprudence. In our June 6, 2011 post, we explored the Second District, Division 6’s recent decision in County of Kern v. Jadwin, where Justice Yegan on behalf of a unanimous panel discussed the California False Claims Act (“CFCA”) (explained, along with
Second District, Division 6 Uses Analogous Federal Case Law in Reaching Result. Under the False Claim Act (Gov Code, § 12650 et seq.), former section 12652(g)(9) provided that a trial court may award the prevailing defendant attorney’s fees if “the claim was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought for purposes of harassment.” (Now, the
Key Difference Was Stipulated Injunction Versus Stipulated Dismissal. In this category before, we have seen cases where disabled plaintiffs were denied fee award requests because they failed to make a prelitigation demand. Where there is a stipulated dismissal, a prelitigation demand is a necessity under the catalyst theory for purposes of a fee
Disability Fee Reversal–Mundy v. RLA Properties, Case Nos. B224667/B225612 (2d Dist., Div. 1 June 23, 2011) (unpublished). In this one, plaintiff in a Disabled Persons Act case, which has a fee-shifting provision in favor of the “prevailing party” (Civ. Code, § 55), lost his attempt to obtain statutory damages in a bench trial,
Fee Petitioner Shows How a Successful Fee Request Should Be Structured. In Jochimsen v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B223518 (2d Dist., Div. 1 June 23, 2011) (unpublished), plaintiff narrowed an excessive police force case down to one civil rights claim, won a difficult jury verdict of $35,000, and then won attorney’s
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Divided Ruling, Felt Bound by Buckhannon, With Interesting Dissents on the Merits and on Jurisprudential Thinking. The federal civil rights statute has a pro-plaintiff fee shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of
Justice Kagan Delivers Unanimous Opinion For The Court. In Fox v. Vice, Case No. 10-114 (U.S. June 6, 2011), a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decided that a “but-for” standard applies when determining whether a prevailing defendant should recover attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in a plaintiff’s suit involving both frivolous and
