The Trial Court, Which Is Not Allowed To Rubberstamp An Attorney Fees Request, Failed To Explain Its Reasoning For The Award That Included A $750 Hourly Rate And A 1.5 Positive Multiplier Despite The Lack Of Complexity and Risk Involved In The Case
In Immigrant Rights Defense Council, LLC v. Ramirez, Case No. B342780 (2d Dist., Div. 3 October 24, 2025) (unpublished), Plaintiff sued Defendant, a retired Homeland Security adjudicator who has been a registered immigration consultant since 2008, alleging violation of the Immigration Consultants Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 22440–22449) (“ICA”). Although several of Plaintiff’s allegations were verifiably false, Defendant entered into a consent judgment with Plaintiff after realizing that his receipts were not in compliance with the ICA. The stipulation provided that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable fees to be determined by post-judgment motion. However, when the lower court awarded Plaintiff its full ask from the fees motion – which included a $750 hourly rate and a 1.5 positive multiplier – Defendant appealed.
The 2/3 DCA, in a 3-0 opinion, reversed and remanded – finding the trial court had abused its discretion in making the fee award without clearly explaining the rationale behind its decision. (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271; Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 921; and Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 750–751.) In its review, the appellate panel noted that the fee award was ordered by a different judge that the trial judge – allowing the panel to exercise ‘ “somewhat more latitude in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion than would be true in the usual case.” ’ ” (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616; see also In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052.
Less than three months before submitting the fees motion, Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed having a $500 hourly rate. Yet, Plaintiff’s counsel provided no explanation for the sudden $250 increase to his hourly rate, and his own declaration contradicted the $750 hourly rate. Additionally, the 1.5 multiplier applied to the inexplicable rate increase appeared arbitrary considering the lack of complexity, risk, or skill demonstrated in this case. Rather, Plaintiff simply filed its recycled boilerplate seven-page complaint that it had previously filed “dozens, if not hundreds, of times.”
Because trial courts should consider whether fees sought are reasonable in ICA cases pursued by a member of the public who has not alleged personal harm, the appellate panel also found that the fee award failed to account for the reasonableness of the total fee award. The consent judgment achieved a very meager public benefit by merely enjoining Defendant from violating existing ICA law, with no specific violations identified to be remedied.
Finally, the 2/3 DCA found that the trial court failed to determine whether Plaintiff had reasonably incurred fees. Plaintiff, based on information and belief, filed a complaint identical to its complaint filed in countless other cases – alleging Defendant violated each of the ICA governing immigration consultants. While the ICA allows plaintiffs to sue on behalf of the public while alleging facts based on “information and belief,” it does not allow a plaintiff to file a lawsuit without a reasonable basis for believing the allegations. Here, Plaintiff made allegations that were verifiably false concerning Defendant, and Defendant informed the trial court that the complaint had been filed without any reasonable suspicion that Defendant had violated the ICA.