Fee Clause Interpretation, Section 1717: Prevailing Alter Ego Entitled To Fee Recovery Based On Fee Clause Allowing For Same In A Payment Dispute

 

Reynolds Metal Drove the Reversal.

     Cooley Constr., Inc. v. Matthews, Case No. G050422 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Feb. 24, 2015) (unpublished) was a situation where an alter ego defendant prevailed against a plaintiff in a construction payment dispute, which had two fees clauses—one specifying no fees for construction disputes and another allowing recovery for payment disputes. The trial court denied alter ego defendant’s fee request based on the theory that he personally was not a signatory to the contract with the fees clause involving payment disputes. (Also, the lower court only granted one-third of defendant’s requested costs.)

     This one got reversed based on Reynolds Metal Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal.3d 124, 128-129 (1975) [one of our Leading Cases], which allowed a nonsignatory alter ego to recover fees under Civil Code section 1717, after the appellate court interpreted the payment dispute fees clause to allow for recovery.

     Justice Aronson was the author of this 3-0 unpublished decision.

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