Fee-Shifting Statute Was A Provision In The Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
In Moore, et al. v. Rubin, No. 25-613-v (2d Dist. Sept. 4, 2026), the Second Circuit was reviewing an attorney’s fees award under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which has a provision allowing a prevailing plaintiff to obtain recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees, scrutinizing a fee award of $4,815,033.25 entered in favor of six women by a district judge in the Eastern District of New York federal court. That award followed on the heels of seven years of heavily contested litigation, involving extensive discovery and a week jury trial where the plaintiffs won $3.85 million against a bond trader defendant. Plaintiffs had requested $8,793,940.83 in fees, but the district court lowered the requested hourly rates and applied a 15% across-the-board cut on hours worked for potential inefficiencies, duplication, block billing, and overstaffing after excluding communications with a litigation funder and efforts in a separate state court action. The challenge on appeal was whether the award was an abuse of discretion.
The Second Circuit affirmed because the award was within the range of permissible decisions for fashioning a fee award in a case of this nature. With respect to hourly rates, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the hourly rates did exceed those generally acceptable in the E.D.N.Y. venue, but agreed with the district court that the decisions to award $1,000 to partners, $800 to “of counsel,” $500 to senior attorneys, $400 to mid-level attorneys, $350 to junior attorneys, $225 to legal apprentices, and $150 to paralegals were justified based on the Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) factors, especially the protracted nature of the litigation, success at trial, and representation of sexual exploitation victims. The compensation for work effort was no abuse of discretion, given the scale-backs by the district judge below. On a “big picture” basis, given the TVPA legislative history to expand the remedies available to victims, the district judge did “rough justice” in the award it made to prevailing plaintiffs.