Special Fee Shifting Statutes: 2/6 DCA’s Reversal Of A Decision Finding No Brown Act Violations Meant That A Remand Was Necessary To Determine If Fees Were Warranted

Because The Statute Is Discretionary, The Trial Judge Was The One To Determine If Fees Should Be Awarded.

               In G.I. Industries v. City of Thousand Oaks, Case No. B337103 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Aug. 5, 2025) (unpublished), the 2/6 DCA reversed a trial court’s ruling that there was no Brown Act violation because an exception was applicable.  The appellate court found a particular city action was null and void based on the Brown Act violation.  The Brown Act, at Government Code section 54960.5, has a discretionary attorney’s fees shifting provision.  Even though there was case law indicating that normally fees are awarded unless the circumstances show the result would be unjust (Los Angeles Times Communications v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal.App.4^th 1313, 1327 (2003)), the appellate panel found that it should remand so that the trial court could decide the issue.