Fybel/Feibush/Fees: Penal Code Section 496(c) Is the Fee-Shifting Predicate.
Although not directly addressing fees but certainly mentioning a fee-shifting statute, Justice Fybel in Bell v. Feibush, 212 Cal.App.4th 1041 (2013) [4th Dist., Div. 3], certainly discusses Penal Code section 496(c). That provisions states that any person “who has been injured by a violation of [Penal Code section 496(a), the criminal theft statute] . . . may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees.”
In Bell, a default judgment was entered against defendant under section 496(c), but he argued that his lack of a conviction prevented the private plaintiff from recovering civil relief (mainly treble damages) against the defendant.
That argument was rejected by the appellate court. Because section 496(a) has broad “any manner constituting theft” language, this can encompass non-conviction events for the private plaintiff to recover treble damages–the statutory said “violation” and not “conviction.” (The result would seem to logically extend to the discretionary fee recovery language in section 496(c), not just the treble damages recovery.) Also, our local Court of Appeals determined that theft by false pretenses met the 496(a) theft requirement.