SLAPP: Fee Recovery Was Proper, Not Barred By The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

 

$125,491.81 Fee Award Against Plaintiff Sustained on Appeal.

     Plaintiff, after being hit with an adverse $125,491.81 fee award after losing a SLAPP motion, challenged the fee award in Ruttlen v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B223345 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Mar. 30, 2011) (unpublished). Her challenge was that the award was unconstitutional and barred by the Noerr-Pennington (Eastern v. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)) doctrine. [That doctrine, which was first applied in the antitrust area and then expanded to other areas, grants general immunity to those who petition any department of government for redress unless the activities are sham in nature.]

     The appellate court found the doctrine did not apply in the SLAPP context. The fatal flaw in the challenge is that the doctrine only immunizes parties from “civil liability,” critically distinguishable from imposing an award under a fee-shifting statute. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 62-63 (2002); accord, Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 115 Cal.App.4th 322, 361-362 (2004); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. N.E.C.A, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 373 (7th Cir. 1987).)

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