Second District, Division 1 Finds No Abuse of Discretion in Awarding Reduced Fees to Winning Defendants.
Here is a case that demonstrates that the mandatory fee awards awardable to defendants under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1) are hinged on reasonable fees, with trial courts not having to rubberstamp fee requests that are too high in nature.
Cammarata v. Bright Imperial Limited, Case Nos. B222909/B218226 (2d Dist., Div. 1 Apr. 29, 2011) (unpublished) was a situation where two groups of defendants won SLAPP motions against plaintiff, with one group requesting $115,436.85 in fees/$3,801.03 in costs and another group requesting $81,292.90 in fees. The trial court granted defendant group #1 fees of $35,000 and defendant group #2 fees of $40,000, fiinding both requested amounts to be “excessive.”
Although everyone appealed, the fee awards were affirmed.
After denying a motion to dismiss the appeal which was effectively mooted by a prior appellate opinion, the Second District, Division 1–in a 3-0 opinion authored by Justice Rothschild–hammered home that only reasonable fees are an entitlement under the SLAPP fee-shifting statute, with the trial court not having to simply award the sums requested. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor, 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 (2008); G.R. v. Intelligator, 185 Cal.App.4th 606, 620 (2010).) Here, because the fee motions by both groups were similar such that duplication was transparent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reducing fees down to a reasonable level. In doing so, the trial court can (and in this instance, did) draw down on such insights as the time spent by the opponent-plaintiff on the SLAPP fee motions and its own experience/expertise in handling complex cases. (Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc., 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1248-1253 (2006).)