Probate—Corman v. Corman, Case No. B251513 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Aug. 29, 2016) (Unpublished)—Partial Beneficiary Success Did Not Justify Fee Award.
In this first one, there was a nasty probate fight (I guess one could conjecture whether any are other than nasty) over trust accountings, which pitted the trustees against beneficiaries in most situations. The lower court found that the beneficiaries had contested the accountings without reasonable cause and in bad faith, ordering them to pay from their trust shares almost $3 million in attorney’s fees and costs the trustees had incurred to defend against the losing beneficiaries’ objections. This one was reversed. The problem was that under Probate Code section 17211(a), beneficiaries did achieve some success in the contests, such that successful contests are not ones that every reasonable attorney would agree are totally and completely without merit. This fee award was reversed in entirety.
SLAPP—Woodward v. Church of Scientology, Case No. B261813 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Aug. 29, 2016) (Unpublished)—Mandatory SLAPP Fee Award Of $90,567.50 Affirmed On Appeal.
L. Ron Hubbard. December 31, 1949. Wikipedia.
The second case involves the Church’s recovery of mandatory defense fees for a SLAPP grant, with the lower court awarding $90,567.50. The appellate court affirmed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. The lower court only awarded 70% of requested fees, with a $463 hourly rate for Los Angeles litigators. No problem on appeal.
Costs—Garibaldi v. City of Long Beach, Case No. B257300 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Aug. 29, 2016) (Unpublished)—Party Obtaining Dismissal, Without Stipulation Otherwise, Entitled To Routine Fees.
Last, this one shows how parties through stipulations can govern their fate in many disputes. A party was dismissed from the suit, but there was no stipulation to waive costs. So, the prevailing party filed a costs memorandum which was stricken by the lower court. The appellate court determined this was error; after all, a party dismissed from a suit is entitled to routine costs under most normal situations. The other side could have asked for a costs waiver, but this was not done. The appellate court also rejected the unity in interest exception under the circumstances. Reversed so that the dismissed party could obtain an award of routine costs.