Affirms $175,000 Fee Award Assessed Against City and Developer Jointly.
Court House Plaza Co. v. City of Palo Alto, Case Nos. H032872/H033204 (6th Dist. June 30, 2010) (unpublished) is a gem of a decision for anyone dealing with a fee award under California’s private attorney general statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
There, plaintiffs obtained a writ of mandate ordering city and developer to comply with environmental laws applicable to proposed projects, finding a CEQA violation in revising a mitigated negative declaration without recirculation for public review. The lower court also rejected other claims and decided injunctive relief was moot in light of the CEQA claim ruling. Later, the trial judge awarded plaintiffs $175,000 out of a requested $246,442.50 in fees under section 1021.5, awarded jointly against city and developer—both of which appealed.
They lost.
Appellants first argued that plaintiffs were not successful because some of their claims were rejected, especially failing to stop building of the projects. Not so, said the appellate panel. Success on all claims is not required, with such a factor going to the amount of the fee to be awarded. (RiverWatch v. County of San Diego Dept. of Environmental Health, 175 Cal.App.4th 768, 782-783 (2009) [discussed on our June 15, 2009 post]; ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1019 (2001).) Plaintiffs were successful because an EIR might be required and the project may not pass muster.
Next, the losing parties contended no significant benefit was conferred. However, the Court of Appeal observed that successful CEQA actions often lead to fee awards under section 1021.5, with the extent of the public benefit not needing to be great to justify a fee award. (Protect Our Water v. County of Merced, 130 Cal.App.4th 488, 496 (2005).) The appellate panel distinguished cases where only a technical, procedural defect in the CEQA process was involved, with a large breadth of discretion being vested in the trial court in making the “public benefit” determination. The Court of Appeal also rejected appellants’ suggestion that a statewide benefit was required under this section 1021.5 prong.
Appellants then argued that the fee award was improper because plaintiffs did not make a settlement attempt before bringing the mandate proceeding. No, that requirement is only one of many factors to be considered in section 1021.5 cases. (Vasquez v. State of California, 45 Cal.4th 243, 258-259 (2008) [one of our Leading Cases].)
That brought the appellate panel to the challenges to the amount of the award. Appellants failed to give as much weight as they should have to the trial court’s reduction of requested fees by 29% such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Plaintiffs’ fees for unrelated services were not out of whack because the trial court has broad discretion to determine whether they contributed to the result of the litigation.
Finally, the trial court’s failure to apportion a greater percentage of the award to the city was no abuse. This decision, too, is a discretionary one for the lower court based on the relative culpability of the various defendants. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp., 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 97-98 (2009) [discussed in our October 7, 2009 post].)