Private Attorney General Statute: Second District, Division 6 Issues Interesting CCP § 1021.5 Apportionment Decision

Appellate Court Remands Total Fee Denial Decision, Finding One Aspect of Case Meets Standards for Private Attorney General Fee Recovery.

     Wilson v. San Luis Obispo County Democratic Central Comm., Case No. B224269 (2d Dist., Div. 6 Feb. 14, 2011) (certified for publication) is an interesting allocation decision in the private attorney general statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5) area.

     In an earlier appeal, the appellate court had issued a published decision in which the Committee prevailed against respondent Wilson, after she made numerous unsuccessful challenges to her removal from office (being a committee member)/right to reinstatement and to the composition of the Committee’s membership (seeking to interfere with the public right of the parties and their members to choose their leaders). The lower court denied Committee’s postjudgment motion for § 1021.5 attorney’s fees of $102,214.55 after Committee prevailed in the prior appeal.

     The Second District, Division 6, in a 3-0 panel opinion authored by Acting Presiding Justice Yegan, affirmed the refusal to award fees for the office removal claim but reversed/remanded on the refusal to award fees on the Committee composition claim.

     Both sides argued for de novo review, which the appellate court found to be appropriate.

     Based on the reasoning in Adoption of Joshua S., 42 Cal.4th 945 (2008), the appellate court found that respondent Wilson was simply a private litigant vindicating her own interests rather than having an institutional interest in the litigation when it came to the office removal claim. Except to be on the losing side of an important appellate case, she had done nothing to adversely affect the public interest.

     However, the result was different on the Committee composition claim. Here, respondent purported to represent the public interest and was challenging the public rights of political parties and their members to choose their leaders. That was the type of fight that gave rise to § 1021.5 fee recovery.

     Because a trial court may legitimately restrict and apportion fee recovery under the private attorney general statute to a portion of an attorney’s efforts meeting the § 1021.5 criteria, see Conservatorship of Whitley, 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1226 (2010), a remand was in order to apportion work and award fees to Committee on the composition claim. Also, Committee was entitled to fees and costs for its successful appellate work the second time around.

Scroll to Top