Private Attorney General: Plaintiff Only Obtaining A Non-Merits Stay In A CEQA Action, In A Dismissed Case, Was Not Entitled To CCP § 1021.5 Fees

$289,544 In Fees Correctly Denied By The Trial Judge On Appeal.

            In Canyon Crest Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. B290379 (2d Dist., Div. 4 Feb. 19, 2020) (unpublished), plaintiff obtained a minor conditional use permit and oak tree permit in connection with constructing a single-family house in undeveloped property in Los Angeles County, but then proceeded to file a CEQA action against the County and various other governmental entities in which plaintiff sought further environmental review.   Plaintiff did obtain an administrative stay to preserve the status quo to make sure the project approvals complied with CEQA, but dismissed the suit after running out of litigation funds once the appropriate governmental entity vacated the project approvals—but not a wholesale vacating based on general policy considerations (simply litigation specific to end plaintiff’s case).  Plaintiff then filed to recoup $289,544 in fees under the private attorney general statute, a request denied by the lower court.

            The 2/4 DCA affirmed.

            The first issue was the appellate standard of review.  The Court of Appeal decided that that the abuse of discretion prism was appropriate, given that there was no prior appellate court determination on issues requiring a de novo scrutiny.   That meant that the lower court determinations were entitled to deference on appeal.

            But the specific analytical dissection of section 1021.5 elements did not require any reversal under the circumstances of this case, in any event.

            First, no public interest was vindicated.  Plaintiff never obtained any additional environmental review under CEQA, so that its broader policy implications were not furthered in this matter.

            Second, there was no significant benefit to the general public.  The administrative stay was not on the merits (only to preserve the status quo) and only benefitted plaintiff’s single lot, with no indication that Los Angeles County could or would change its policies on tree issues.  In essence, this was a limited private matter which did not result in a policy change—not the stuff that justified a § 1021.5 fee award.

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