Second District, Division 8 Affirms Trial Court’s Conclusion That Fees Not Justified Under “Needs Based” Family Code Section 2030.
Ex-wife, whose resources were in the eight figures (given that ex-husband was wealthy based on his ownership interest in a private held Delaware corporation), sought to recoup $692,000 in attorney’s fees for efforts in attempting to unseal some confidential documents from both ex-husband and the corporation. The primary basis for the request was the “needs based” fee shifting statute codified at Family Code section 2030. The trial court denied the fee request, finding (1) ex-wife did not need a fee award given that her net worth was well into eight figures; (2) it did not matter than ex-husband was wealthier than ex-wife; (3) the prior sealing of corporate documents had not hampered ex-wife’s ability to actually use them in the dissolution proceeding; (4) ex-wife’s position in the marital proceedings was not compromised one iota; and (5) the sealing battles were not “related” to the dissolution proceeding under section 2030.
Above: (1) seals; (2) Great Seal; (3) ceiling.
Although wife appealed the fee denial, the Court of Appeal affirmed in Marriage of Armour and Ritter, Case No. B218221 (2d Dist., Div. 8 August 3, 2010) (unpublished).
The appellate panel agreed that the sealing battles were not “related” (a determination reviewed under the substantial evidence test) because they did not impact ex-wife’s ability to protect her interests in the marital proceedings. (In re Marriage of Seaman & Menjou, 1 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1496-1497 (1991) [dealing with the predecessor statute to section 2030].) Furthermore, the 2-to-1 difference in net worth between ex-husband and ex-wife, alone, did not justify a fee award given that ex-wife did have parity given her substantial net worth. (Alan S. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 251-252 (2009) [purpose of section 2030 is parity, not redistribution of money from the greater income party to the lesser income party].) Finally, the reviewing court rejected the notion that she vindicated some private attorney general public right, finding she cited no authority for engrafting Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 factors into the fee parity decision-making process under section 2030.
BLOG UNDERVIEW—Bad pun coming (word play on Armour)—ex-husband was obviously no longer an “amour” but did avoid fee exposure in the appeal by the disgruntled ex-wife.