The Reversal: Marriage of Schneider, Case No. B215675 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Aug. 24, 2010) (Unpublished).
This one involved Colorado litigation by ex-husband about ex-wife’s misappropriation of his personal property in a storage facility, which followed apparently contentious California dissolution proceedings. Husband claimed the misappropriated property was worth $363,000, but a Colorado jury only found ex-wife only took property worth $40,000. However, under Colorado law, ex-husband recovered nothing because, in tort actions there, a 70% fault allocation to him required entry of judgment in ex-wife’s favor. Ex-wife then sought $516,981 in “needs based” fees under Family Code section 2030 and sanctions under section 271 of 516,981 (inclusive of $164,036.25 in Colorado defense expenses) for California/Colorado efforts. Ex-husband filed a dueling fee motion for section 271 sanctions of $376,000 against ex-wife. However, the trial court severed consideration of fees relating to the Colorado action.
What did the lower court do with respect to prior California proceedings? Ex-wife was awarded $225,000 in 2030 fees and $10,000 in 271 sanctions, while ex-husband was denied any 271 sanctions against ex-wife, determinations affirmed in a prior appeal (Schneider I).
So what happened with respect to “related” Colorado proceedings? Ex-wife sought additional fees of $490,790.35, while ex-husband asked for fees as 271 sanctions. The trial court ordered ex-husband to pay $100,000 (out of the requested $490,790.35) to ex-wife, but also directed ex-wife to pay $10,000 to ex-husband as 271 sanctions.
Now, what happened on appeal? Actually, a reversal. The appellate court found no evidence supporting the trial court’s implicit premise that ex-wife’s misappropriation was accomplished in bad faith, bolstered by the jury’s conclusion that only 12% of the total property value sought by ex-husband was compensable. The reduction of ex-wife’s fees was unfounded because she did not initiate the Colorado fight. The matter was remanded to have the trial judge prepare findings to justify any fee reductions. Finally, the 271 sanctions to ex-husband were overturned primarily given that ex-wife was forced to defend the misappropriation action brought by ex-husband in Colorado.
The Affirmance: Marriage of Gimple and Parker, Case No. A123565 (1st Dist., Div. 2 Aug. 24, 2010) (Unpublished).
This one contains very scholarly discussions of the standards governing awards under sections 2030/2032 and 271, which we commend for reading.
Although the fee awards were not that substantial (under $15,000 to ex-husband), they were affirmed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard because the family law judge did consider factors in additional to financial circumstances and had a global perspective of the dissolution dispute, a critical factor found necessary by our local Santa Ana court in Alan S. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 251-255 (2009)—a decision being oft-cited by other courts in the family law area. Beyond that, the Court of Appeal did find that some dated income and financial statements may have been considered, but determined reliance on them was nonprejudicial in nature (with prejudice being a key appellate concern in reviewing a lower court decision). See, e.g., Burkle v. Burkle, 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 403 (2007); In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 822-823 (2008). The fee awards were affirmed, in this one.
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