The Protected Activity Claimed By Defendant Supported Only An Element Of Plaintiff’s Causes Of Action, But Did Not Subject Those Causes Of Action To A Challenge Under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16.
In Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., Case No. B303182 (2d Dist., Div. 7 April 19, 2021) (unpublished), FEHA plaintiff sued LAUSD claiming race and age discrimination, based on a disparate impact theory, and retaliation after being terminated from his teaching position. Prior to termination, plaintiff had been placed on paid suspension for more than three years pending the outcome of LAUSD’s investigation into a student’s assault accusation, and had filed a discrimination complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DEFH) approximately a year into his paid suspension.
After successfully SLAPPing plaintiff’s FEHA action, by claiming each of plaintiff’s causes of action arose from its investigation which were acts in furtherance of its rights of petition and free speech within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, and that plaintiff could not establish a probability of prevailing on his claims, LAUSD was granted the full amount of its motion for $44,800 in attorney fees pursuant to § 425.16(c)(1).
Plaintiff appealed and the 2/7 DCA reversed – finding that LAUSD had not shown that plaintiff’s causes of action arose from LAUSD’s investigation as a whole, nor from any communications made during its investigation. In fact, plaintiff agreed that LAUSD was obligated to investigate the student’s accusation, and the existence of an official proceeding does not necessarily transform any claim related to that proceeding into an action subject to challenge pursuant to § 425.16(e)(2).
Because the appellate panel reversed the trial court’s granting of LAUSD’s anti-SLAPP motion, the § 425.16(c)(1) attorney fees award was also reversed.