Estate of Alders, Case No. A171324 (1st Dist., Div. 3 Mar. 23, 2026) (unpublished) examines the diligence required from both litigants and superior courts to secure costs-of-proof sanctions for unreasonable denial of RFAs under CCP § 2033.420(a).
There, a will contest proponent lost, via a summary judgment and trial, all of his claims, with the successful party seeking almost $1.5 million in costs-of-proof sanctions for losing party’s denial of 13 requests for admissions which were served at an early phase of the contest, even though they were targeted at important issues (although some were asking for legal conclusions, which is not per se impermissible). [Note: only one deposition had been taken, that of the will drafting attorney which did not materially implicate the requested RFAs.] The lower court determined that the RFAs were directed at issues of concern in the summary judgment proceeding/trial, that the losing litigant did not have a reasonable ground to believe he would prevail in the will contest, and that the legal conclusion objection was not proper. However, based principally on the fact that the costs-of-proof requesting party had billed for “general trial preparation” and had asked for a huge number that seemed to go beyond proving RFA requests during the case, the lower court completely denied the costs-of-proof sanctions request.
The 1/3 DCA reversed and remanded. The panel determined that the lower court abused its discretion because, after finding most of its reasoning supported some amount of sanctions, it categorically determined that general trial preparation effort could not justify a fee recovery—something which was not justified under the statute or interpretive cases. Denying all expenses because some included unrelated trial preparation costs was an abuse of discretion.
However, in remanding, the appellate court did provide some insightful guidance to the parties and lower court: (1) it did find that some work, such as for weekly trial team meetings and objections to discovery responses, might well not relate to proving the truth of the denied RFAs; (2) the trial court was tasked with awarding reasonable expenses, given the substantial nature of the sanctions request; and (3) the trial court could consider the timing of the RFAs—at an early juncture of the case—to target generalized legal conclusions rather than specific facts before depositions were taken (Pappas v. Chang, 75 Cal.App.5th 975, 994 (2022); Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson, 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 130 (2020). So, the matter was remanded with substantial insights provided by the appellate court on factors which should be considered.