“Borrowing” Statute’s Fee Provision Does Not Translate to Fee Exposure Under UCL.
In a case of first impression, the Second District, Division Three reconciled two conflicting statutory schemes, deciding that a prevailing defendant was not entitled to a fee recovery under a fee-shifting statute used only as a “borrowing” statute predicate under California’s Unfair Competition Law. (Defendant sought to recover $29,723.50 in attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting provisions of the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act.) However, because this statutory scheme was only used as the predicate for a UCL claim, the UCL policy of not awarding fees to a successful defendant trumped the reciprocal provision of the “borrowed” statute. This result was reached in Davis v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Case No. B204047 (2d Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 19, 2009) (certified for publication).