Key Difference Was Stipulated Injunction Versus Stipulated Dismissal.
In this category before, we have seen cases where disabled plaintiffs were denied fee award requests because they failed to make a prelitigation demand. Where there is a stipulated dismissal, a prelitigation demand is a necessity under the catalyst theory for purposes of a fee award, with the courts borrowing a private attorney general statute analytical decision-making process. (Mundy v. Neal, 186 Cal.App.4th 256, 260 (2010).)
However, a fee denial of a requested $8,087.50 was reversed in Rodriguez v. Russi, Case No. B227161 (2d Dist., Div. 3 July 1, 2011) (unpublished), where the defense stipulated to judgment through an accepted CCP § 998 offer to $1,000 in statutory damages, an injunction to mount a full-length mirror, and statutory costs. (BLOG OBSERVATION–Note there was a stipulated injunction rather than a stipulated dismissal.) The lower court rationale was that no prelitigation demand had been made by plaintiff.
Manzanar. Photographer: Ansel Adams. 1943.
Plaintiff obtained a reversal when challenging the fee denial.
In this instance, the stipulated injunction–unlike a stipulated dismissal–did change the parties’ relationships so as to trigger fee entitlement. Given the injunction, this was not a catalyst case so that no prelitigation demand was necessary. The matter was remanded to award reasonable attorney’s fees, although the lower court was directed to consider where plaintiff was overreaching on hourly rate/hours worked and attempts to recover fees incurred before defendant was served with the action. Beyond that, the 998 offer limited fees up through a certain period; it was accepted, so fees after the acceptance were no-go.