First District, Division Three Finds No Abuse of Discretion In Awarding Substantial Fees Under Section 1021.5.
Uphold Our Heritage, an organization of local citizens and architects/authors from around the world, successfully brought a mandamus action against Town of Woodside and Mr. Jobs, an individual seeking a permit to demolish the historic Jackling House
(built by a key figure in the American cooper industry and designed by George Washington Smith, a leading architect in the Spanish Colonial Revival style containing many unique cooper fixtures reflective of Jackling’s work in the mining industry). The Town certified an environmental impact report and conditionally authorized the demolition permit. Heritage obtained mandamus from the lower court to set aside approval of the demolition permit based on Town’s feasibility findings not being supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court affirmed the lower court ruling in a published decision. (See Uphold Our Heritage v. Town of Woodside, 147 Cal.App.4th 587 (2007).)
So, guess what happened next? You are right, Heritage filed a motion for attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, California’s private attorney general statute. The trial court awarded Heritage $403,548 in fees on this basis: lodestar of 581.8 hours at hourly rates ranging between $110-500 for attorneys/paralegals/law clerks (a total lodestar figure of $221,774), plus a 2.0 multiplier after credit for noncontingent fees paid, which reflected a reduction in some senior attorney hourly rates, an increase for one junior attorney’s hourly rate, and a reduction of the 2.8 multiplier requested by Heritage in the fee motion. Town/Mr. Jobs appealed.
The First District, Division Three, in the 3-0 unpublished opinion of Uphold Our Heritage v. Town of Woodside, Case Nos. A120749 & A120757 (1st Dist., Div. 3 Nov. 12, 2008) (unpublished) authored by Acting Presiding Justice Pollak, affirmed despite the fact the award was substantial in nature.
Driving the affirmance was the Court of Appeal’s perception that demolition of the home would have eliminated the historic value preservation possibilities for the public, a tangible public interest transcending Heritage’s private interests. Because Heritage was composed of diverse individuals, it did not matter that one member’s personal attachment to the house was at play. (See Mejia v. City of Los Angeles, 156 Cal.App.4th 151, 159 (2007).)
Based on the Serrano factors, the appellate panel found that the trial court made proper reductions and increases in arriving at the lodestar, properly awarded paralegal time, and correctly enhanced with a multiplier based on the novel and problematic nature of the dispute. Justice Pollak also found it was appropriate to allow attorney compensation for medial public relations efforts. (See Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992), rehg. denied, jdg. vacated in part and cause remanded, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).) The panel finally observed that the 2.0 multiplier “is well within the range of acceptability,” citing Wershba v. Apple v. Computer, Inc., 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255 (2001) [multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher]; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 (2008) [2.5 multiplier was not out of line with prevailing case law and did not constitute abuse of discretion].