First District, Division 4 So Decides, Also Denying Fees on a Different Theory Raised After Losing the § 1038 Request—Counseling to Seek Fees on Multiple Grounds the First Time Around. State entities eventually defended against a civil rights claim brought by a peace officer organization under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. State entities then moved
“No Harm, No Foul” Means No Real Reason to Award Fees Under a Discretionary Statute. For those of you who litigate construction actions, you likely are familiar with the requirement that indemnity cross-complainants must file a certificate of merit—after obtaining a favorable expert opinion—in cross-claims filed against professional engineers, architects, or surveyors. (Code Civ.
No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Fees Altogether Where Plaintiff Awarded $11,500 But Requested $870,935.50 In Fees. In Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, Case No. S162313 (Cal.Sup.Ct. Jan. 14, 2010) (certified for publication), our state supreme court faced the collision of two statutory schemes: the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),
Feess on Fees: Award Equals $779,100.34 in Fees, $11,769.20 in Expenses, and $28,776.49 in Other Costs. We learned from an unpublished order in the next case that according to a recent American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association survey, “the average patent infringement suit with between $1 million and $25 million at stake costs $1.794
$121,848.16 Compensation Award to Intervener Upheld on Appeal. In a very scholarly opinion, Presiding Justice Mallano—on behalf of a 3-0 panel—upheld a $121,848.16 compensation award (including attorney’s fees) to a consumer interest intervener in an unsuccessful challenge to certain amended regulations made by insurance companies. The basis for the award was Insurance Code section
Part 2 of 2: Second Ten Grouping—Nos. 1-10. We already gave you our top 11-20 decisions previously this month. As noted in an earlier post, we have accumulated our “top 20” attorney’s fees decisions, recognizing that we limit the list to published decisions and that the order reflects nothing about the importance of
Part 1 of 2: First Ten Grouping—Nos. 11-20. As noted in an earlier post, we have accumulated our “top 20” attorney’s fees decisions, recognizing that we limit the list to published decisions and that the order reflects nothing about the importance of the decision. Rather, we try to survey decisions of interest in different
Temporary Stay, Magistrate Tentative Summary Judgment Ruling, and Dismissal Based on Ripeness/Mootness Did Not Justify Fee Award. The prevailing party in a dispute governed by the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. sec. 2412, is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees if the party achieved “a material alteration in the legal
Third District’s Affirmance of Prompt Payment Statute Result Ices Correctness of Fee Award. In one of our past posts (see January 16, 2009 discussion of the unpublished decision of Li v. Wu), we briefly discussed one of the construction prompt payment statutes. The Legislature has enacted several “prompt payment” statutes designed to make sure
Prior Adjudication Precluded the Subsequent Award. In South Bay Rod and Gun Club v. Dashiell, Case No. D053658 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Dec. 4, 2009) (unpublished), director/real estate broker won a lawsuit against non-profit Club over a real estate option transaction. Winning director then sought fees in connection with his slander of title claim
