Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Award Of Fees Under Civil Code Section 3496 Against City Of El Monte Was Affirmed On Appeal

Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

Procedural Challenge Did Not Prevail. In City of El Monte v. Lincoln, Case No. B344087 (2d Dist., Div. 2 Feb. 23, 2026) (unpublished), City lost a post-judgment fee order against plaintiff based on losing successive demurrers based on Civil Code section 3496.  That section, applying to abatement by a municipality relating to a controlled substance, […]

Allocation, Probate, Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Where There Were Dueling Probate Petitions For Financial Elder Abuse Claims, The Prevailing Petitioner—Even Though A Cross-Respondent Defensing The Unsuccessful Elder Abuse Petition—Was Entitled To Intertwined Fee Work For Prevailing As A Petitioner And Defending As A Cross-Respondent

Cases: Allocation, Cases: Probate, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

Other Cases In Unilateral Fee-Shifting Contexts Were Distinguishable. In Haun v. Pagano, Case No. D084385 (4th Dist., Div. 1 Jan. 18, 2026) (published), the nature of the probate proceedings looks like it drove the result in the case as far as awarding fees under the financial elder abuse statute, which only allows unilateral fee-shifting in

Reasonableness of Fees, Special Fee Shifting Statutes, Substantiation Of Reasonableness Of Fees:  $33,712.91 Fee Award To Prevailing Party Neighbor Was Affirmed In A Complicated Civil Harassment Matter

Cases: Reasonableness of Fees, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes, Cases: Substantiation of Reasonableness of Fees

$650 Hourly Rate For 15-Year Attorney And $450 For A Paralegal Were Found Reasonable In A Contentious Santa Clara County Case. Two neighbors had very bad experiences with each other, with one neighbor obtaining a civil harassment restraining order (CHRO) and being awarded $33,712.91 in prevailing party attorney’s fees under CCP § 527.6 against the

Special Fee Shifting Statutes, Undertaking: Prevailing Defendant In A Derivative Lawsuit—After Losing A Bond Motion–Can Seek Trial And Appellate Costs, Not Limited By The $50,000 Bonding Amount Specified In Corporations Code Section 17709.02

Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes, Cases: Undertaking

Section 17709.02 Does Not Trump The CCP § 1032 Trial Routine Costs Statute Or The CRC 8.891 Appellate Routine Costs Provision. In Barrios v. Chraghchian, Case No. B341773 (2d Dist., Div. 8 Jan. 20, 2026) (published), a defendant brought a bond motion under Corporations Code section 17709.02 to have a derivative lawsuit plaintiff furnish security

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Winning Plaintiff In Car Towing Dispute Did Not Have Fee Recovery Entitlement Under Civil Code Section 3070

Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

Interlocutory Determination Of Entitlement Was Not Binding, With Section 3070 Being Inapplicable With Respect To Fee Recovery. Plaintiff won an apartment complex car towing dispute against some defendants, but she was denied requested attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 3070 in Ramsey v. Moore St. Investments, Inc., Case Nos. D084287 et al. (4th Dist., Div.

Equity, Section 1717: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Losing Reformation Cross-Claim, Where A Contractual Fee Shifting Provision Was Involved, Properly Assessed With An Award Of $547,587 In Attorney’s Fees To Two Prevailing Cross-Complainants

Cases: Equity, Cases: Section 1717, Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

Reformation Cross-Claim Was “On The Contract,” Apportionment Was Unnecessary, And Awarding Against Cross-Defendant Only Was No Abuse Of Discretion. Modern civil litigation is an expensive, draining process, whether at the state or federal levels.  Where there is fee shifting at play, it becomes even more risky for litigants, as demonstrated by Favilli v. Tung, Case

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Reversal Of Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act Case Involving Relocation Benefits, Based On Lack Of Substantial Evidence, Justified Affirmance Of Over $94,600 In EAJA Fees To Plaintiffs

Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

“Incurred” Under EAJA Is An Expansive Term, Encompassing Pro Bono Or Derivative Efforts. Plaintiffs, in Benally v. U.S. Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation, Case No. 23-3978 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2025) (published), obtained a reversal on substantial evidence grounds of an adverse relocation benefits decision (both at the administrative and district court levels)

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Litigant Successfully Annulling Contempt Order In Workplace Restraining Order Proceedings Properly Was Denied An Attorney’s Fees Award

Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

None Of The Claimed Bases Justified A Fees Award. In City of Grass Valley v. Coulter, Case No. C102046 (3d Dist. Sept. 19, 2025) (unpublished), City obtained a workplace restraining order against Coulter under CCP section 527.8, subsequently later obtaining a contempt order against Coulter for violating the restraining order. The contempt order was annulled

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Retirement Community Could Account For Class Action Defense Costs For Litigation In Their Annual Budgets

Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

Consumer Legal Remedies/Elder Abuse Statutes Did Not Preempt, Although Defense Costs Had To Be Reviewed On Remand To Make Sure They Were Not Inflated In Nature.                In Johnson v. Stoneridge Creek Pleasanton CCRC LLC, Case No. A170383 (1st Dist., Div. 4 Aug. 19, 2025) (published), the question was whether a continuing care retirement community

Special Fee Shifting Statutes: Because Plaintiff Prevailed Through Mandate Challenging A Conditional Permit Revocation, It Correctly Was Denied Fees Under A Local Public Nuisance Ordinance With Reciprocal Fee-Shifting Provisions

Cases: Special Fee Shifting Statutes

No Fee Entitlement Was Shown.                Plaintiff obtained mandate relief against a municipality in a permit revocation dispute, subsequently moving for attorney’s fees under reciprocal fee-shifting provisions of the Perris Municipal Code relating to public nuisances.  The lower court denied Plaintiff’s motion for fees under the municipal code.  That determination was affirmed on appeal in

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