Fourth District, Division Three Finds Appealability and Affirms Fees In a Rescissionary Case. Our local Santa Ana-based appellate court, the Fourth District, Division Three, faced an appeal of a fee award based upon a rescissionary theory. It affirmed the award in Deen v. Fisler, Case No. G038907 (4th Dist., Div. 3
Sixth District Affirms Fee Award Assessed Against Litigant Who Brought Section 128.7 Motion That Was Denied. In Star Building Systems v. G.W. Davis, Inc., Case No. H032093 (6th Dist. June 27, 2008) (unpublished), plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, after a demurrer was sustained with leave, with an unjust enrichment claim
Second District, Division Three Rules on Scope and Reasonableness of Certain Fees Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5. Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, one segment of California’s Elder Abuse Act, is a mandatory fee-shifting provision. In relevant part, section 15657.5 provides: “(a) Where it is proven by a preponderance
Fourth District, Division One Holds Acceptance of Payment of a Standalone Fee Order Waived the Right to Appeal. The next case deals with the principle holding that voluntary acceptance of benefits will sometimes waive the right to appeal. The context was a fee motion winner accepting payment from the loser, but
Fourth District, Division Three Reinforces the Principle In an Unpublished Decision. In our “Cases: Appealability” section, you will find several cases stressing the necessity to separately appeal a fee award in order to even obtain review by the appellate court. The next case reinforces, yet again, that lesson.
Second District Affirms Fee Award Against Both Assignor and Assignee Based on California Wholesale and the Assignor’s Surety Status. One of the time-honored principles in assignment law is that assignee’s voluntary acceptance of benefits normally means consent to bear the burdens from the assignment. Civil Code sec. 1589. However, the assignor
First District Reverses Summary Judgment in ADA Case; Fee Award Also Reversed Because Appellant Separately Appealed It. In posts for June 6 and 7, 2008, we reviewed several decisions that denied review of fee awards because the appealing party did not bring a separate appeal. Here, we happily review a decision
Fourth District, Division 3 So Holds In Real Estate Nondisclosure Case. As in life, we sometimes see appellate decisions come out in cycles that teach or reinforce very important points. Appealability is an issue highlighted in our June 6, 2008 post (discussing the unpublished Johnson decision from the Second District) and in
Fourth District, Division Two Clarifies in a 2002 Decision That An Appeal From a Judgment on the Merits and on Fee Entitlement, Even Though Amount Is Determined Later, Is Timely In Nature. Yesterday, in our June 6, 2008 post, we discussed an unpublished Second District decision—Johnson v. Greenberg, Case No. B197894 (2d
Second District Does Not Rescue Appellant Who Failed to Appeal From Fee Award Order. Appealing timely is a jurisdictional matter. Because postjudgment orders awarding or denying costs/attorney’s fees are separately appealable, losing parties need to be vigilant. If you happen to be asleep at the wheel (and don’t separately appeal the fee
