Plaintiff’s Appeal Of The Later Judgment Incorporating Fees Was Appealable, But Lower Court’s $62,500 Fee Award Was No Abuse Of Discretion.
In Norman v. Ross, Case Nos. B316971 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 4 Apr. 23, 2024) (partially published; fee discussion not published), three defendants won a SLAPP motion on plaintiff’s claims, while two other defendants had their SLAPP motions denied in part on certain of plaintiff’s claims although the appellate reversed the SLAPP denial. Defendants moved for SLAPP attorney’s fees, requesting $436,192.88 in total. The lower court found that the case was not that novel, that plaintiff did drive up the litigation expenses in some regards, and that the defense took a “maximalist approach” to litigating the matter. The trial judge awarded $125,000 in total to defendants, allowing them to apportion among themselves but entering a final judgment in favor of three defendants awarding them half or $62,500 in fees. Plaintiff appealed, arguing the fee awards for the three defendants were still excessive.
The 2/4 DCA, in an unpublished portion of the opinion, affirmed. The panel had to confront the defendants’ argument that the appeal was premature because the fee order was just an interlocutory order not yet appealable. The appellate court disagreed, finding that it had enough finality even though case law was in conflict (following the lead of the City of Colton, Baharian-Mehr, and Apex opinions over contrary reasoning in Doe v. Luster and cases aligned with Doe). On the merits, however, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in the fees awarded to the three defendants because it did substantially discount the requests by the defense and there was no need to apportion because the lower court indicated that the defense was in the better position to apportion among the respective clients. It also chided plaintiff’s counsel for bombastic appellate briefing on the fee issue, stressing the need for civility and professionalism.