This Follows Its Earlier Conclusion In The Published Clapkin Case.
On March 17, 2026, we posted on Clapkin v. Levin, 119 Cal.App.5th 222 (2026), a 2/7 DCA opinion where the appellate court determined that an order denying a SLAPP fee motion is not appealable. The same Division followed that reasoning in Moussazadeh v. Integrative Surgical Associates Group LLC, Case Nos. B346388 et al. (2d Dist., Div. 7 June 18, 2026) (unpublished), coming to the same conclusion but with respect to an order granting a SLAPP fee motion. Here is what Acting Justice Segal, the author of the opinion as well as Clapkin, had to say: “As we held in Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139, and reaffirmed in Clapkin v. Levin, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th 222, an order denying a motion for attorneys’ fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c), is not appealable. (Doe, at p. 142.) In Doe we concluded the plain meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (i), which authorizes an appeal from an order granting or denying a special motion to strike, did not encompass a ruling on ‘an interlocutory order granting or denying attorney fees following the trial court’s ruling on a special motion to strike.’ (Doe, at p. 147.) We continue to follow Doe and decline to follow cases concluding that, where a party appeals from an order granting or denying a special motion to strike, section 425.16, subdivision (i), also confers appellate jurisdiction over an order granting or denying attorneys’ fees. (See, e.g., Gumarang v.
Braemer on Raymond, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 370, 387-388; Baharian-Mehr v. Smith (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 265, 275.) The problem with Gumarang and Baharian-Mehr is that the statutory language does not support their conclusion. That it might be more efficient to consider appeals from both orders at the same time does not override the plain statutory language making only one of the orders appealable.” (Slip Op., at p. 22.)
BLOG UPDATE: No parties sought review of Clapkin, such that this split in thinking will continue to exist for now.