Acting Presiding Justice Segal Penned The 3-0 Opinion On Various Merits, Costs, And Fee Issues In A 74-Page Opinion.
In Beecham v. City of Azusa, Case No. B33843 (2d Dist., Div. 7 Mar. 23, 2026) (unpublished), deceased trustee, through a substituted personal presentative, sued two City entities (City), an irrigation company, and a water committee for alleged contractual, financial elder abuse, and various tort claims based on diverting water from and trespassing on her property. After a prior appeal, City prevailed completely on plaintiff’s claims, and was subsequently awarded costs of $94,473.54, but denied supplemental costs and fees under CCP §§ 1038 & 2033.420. Plaintiff prevailed on a negligent maintenance/repair claim against water irrigation company to the tune of $90,000, although that judgment was reversed in this appeal. Plaintiff appealed the costs award to City, while City independently appealed the denial of further costs and fees. A cost award in favor of the water committee was also reversed.
The 2/7 DCA affirmed the costs and fees awards involving plaintiff and City. The costs award to City was no abuse of discretion. Other arguments relating to plaintiff’s claims that she was entitled to costs against the City were dispatched this way: (1) plaintiff was not entitled to financial elder abuse claim costs against City because she did not prove liability against the City; and (2) plaintiff was not entitled to a “cost shield” under the inverse condemnation statute because she did not allege an inverse condemnation claim. City did not have to apportion costs between claims because they prevailed on all the salient claims.
That brought the Court to consideration of City’s appeal on the costs/fee denial.
CCP § 1038 does allow a public entity to obtain defense costs, for prevailing on summary judgment motions and other trial motions, if plaintiff’s claim was unreasonable (a legal question) or not brought in good faith (a factual question). City did not show either factor because the trial denied motions (including a summary judgment motion) to allow plaintiff to proceed to trial, with analogous malicious prosecution cases holding such a denial negated an unreasonableness determination. With respect to denial of RFA costs-of-proof sanctions, the record did not bear out that plaintiff lacked reasonable grounds for certain denials based on the summary judgment denial and other evidence she produced on the financial elder abuse claim during discovery/in opposition to a SJM motion.