Lodestar: Second Time Around, Fourth District, Division 2 Sustains Lodestar Analysis Of Trial Court In Awarding $959,925 In Fees

Trial Judge Also Correctly Awarded Interest on Fee Award and $193,800 In Appellate Attorney’s Fees.

     McCasland v. Beckman, Case No. E049166 (4th Dist., Div. 2 Sept. 10, 2010) (unpublished) (McCasland II) is the second group of appeals addressing attorney’s fees awarded to winners of a contract dispute, after the appellate court affirmed the merits determination by the trial judge. However, in the prior appeal, the Fourth District, Division 2 reversed a $2,734,081 fee award to winners, determining that the lower court did not adequately explain the lodestar basis for its award—which effectively granted fees under a contingency fee agreement that translated to a lodestar plus a 2.8 multiplier. The case was remanded for a re-determination of the amount of fees to be awarded winners.

     On remand, the trial court—a different judge—awarded $959,925 in attorney’s fees based on finding that the case was not difficult, was not novel, and was really only a damages case. The trial court also awarded interest from the date of the original judgment on the attorney’s fees award and determined winners were entitled to $193,800 in appellate fees for prevailing on the prior appeal.

     The panel in McCasland II affirmed across the board.

     The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in applying the lodestar factors this time around and arriving at a much lower fee award.

     No error was committed in awarding interest from the date of the original entry of judgment date, even though losers argued that the trigger date would be the date that winners filed their post-appeal fees motion. The reason was that the prior reversal was for all practical purposes only a modification because fees of some amount were clearly deserving to the winners. Because the prior reversal was a modification, interest was to run from the date of the original judgment. (Munoz v. City of Union City, 173 Cal.App.4th 199, 203-204 (2009).)

     The appellate fee award was no abuse of discretion because (1) it was adequately supported by detailed billing statements (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 (2005)), and (2) the appellate hourly fee rate of $300 was not excessive (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 155 (2006) [attorneys based in inland San Diego County charged hourly rates of $350, $275 and $270]).

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