In The News/Substantiation of Fees . . . . D.C. Federal District Judge Wants To Review Defense Billings For Purposes Of Gauging Reasonableness Of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Fee Requests In Handgun Ban Case

 

Plaintiff’s Attorneys Urged Using Updated Laffey Matrix on Hourly Rate Determination.

     Plaintiffs in Heller v. District of Columbia, Case No. 03-CV-1213-EGS (D.D.C.) have requested an award of attorney’s fees totaling $3.13 million in the handgun ban case Colt Revolver.  brought on behalf of Dick Heller and a group of D.C. residents. The request is being made under the federal civil rights fee-shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The fee request has drawn a lot of news and vigorous opposition by the District of Columbia.

     The fee motion filed by Plaintiffs, spearheaded by lead attorney Alan Gura of Alexandria, VA’s Gura & Possessky, PLLC, is worth reading because it has a good discussion of the differences between the Laffey Matrix and the Updated Laffey Matrix (the latter based on work by economist Michael Kavanaugh), matrices used in establishing a reasonable hourly rate for attorney work. Plaintiffs advocated using the Updated Matrix, while D.C. wanted to use the Laffey Matrix. Based on one news report, U.S. District Judge Emmett Sullivan, the judge deciding the fee request, had indicated that the Laffey Matrix was “bargain basement” and “only goes so far.” (BLOG COMMENTARY–If you would like to view our discussions on and judicial attitudes about these two matrices, see our posts of December 28 & 31, 2010.)

     D.C. had advocated awarding Plaintiffs’ counsel fees of only $722,000.

     In supporting their fee requests, Plaintiffs also used an hourly fee survey contained in the 2009 The National Law Journal and a declaration from a legal placement specialist.

     Now, after initially turning down a request by Mr. Gura that defense billings be inspected, District Judge Sullivan has decided that he would like to review the billings by D.C.’s attorneys to gauge the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ requested fees. He said the records, while perhaps not dispositive, would aid his work on the fee request issue. (SECOND BLOG COMMENTARY–For a post discussing different judicial attitudes on discovery of an opponent’s billings on the fee reasonableness issue, see our posts of June 8, 2008 [general discussion] and September 6, 2008 [discussion of unpublished Horsford II decision dealing with same issue].)

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