However, Lower Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Enter Merits Judgments Following Voluntary Dismissal.
McVeigh v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (MacLeod), Case No G049461 (4th Dist., Div. 3 May 11, 2015) (unpublished) is somewhat a study into subject matter jurisdiction in the SLAPP context, involving convoluted proceedings which really did not change the fee ruling but did show how certain post-dismissal “judgments” or “corrections” were void matters.
Basically, the appellate court sustained the idea that a lower court, even after a voluntary dismissal of a SLAPP proceeding, did have power to adjudicate the fee motion in favor of a winning defendant. But the problem was that the lower court, following dismissal, entered void orders going to the merits—that was taboo.
Presiding Justice O’Leary was the penning author, and this is must reading on what can and cannot be done by a trial judge in a post-dismissal SLAPP context.