Challenge To Reasonableness Of Hourly Rate And Work Performed Rebuffed.
California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (sometimes dubbed a “lemon law” in car/RV cases) has a fee-shifting provision which requires the trial court to engage in a little bit different analysis, but not really that different under the lodestar method: determine the actual time expended and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable. (Civ. Code, §1794(d).) In fact, case law has agreed that the lodestar method applies to awards under this section. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc., 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818-819 (2006).)
Section 1794(d) was at issue in Leinberger v. Keystone RV Co., Case No. G049341 (4th Dist., Div. 3 Oct. 2, 2015) (unpublished), where the parties in an RV travel trailer dispute settled for $72,000 on the edge of trial, leaving the lower court to determine reasonable attorney’s fees. Plaintiff’s attorneys requested $119,862 for 252 hours of work based on an hourly rate of $475, but the lower court awarded $60,000 for 180 hours of time at a $330 hourly rate.
Plaintiff’s appeal of the fee award as “not enough” did not prevail.
The defense did rebut the $475 hourly rate by indicating they only charged $300 per hour for comparable work and by showing that plaintiffs’ attorneys garnered $250-350 per hour in state court cases in lemon law cases (although they did get $400 or more per hour in one federal case). So, as we have noted in prior posts, the hourly rate charged by defense counsel can have probative value in fee proceedings—with the defense rate found to be much more in line with what should be charged. With respect to cutting the number of hours expended, the lower court was correct to find there was no need to assign two high-billing attorneys to handle a routine lemon law case (put another way, “deploying such big guns was, in effect, overkill”). Although acknowledging that plaintiff had the right to employ counsel of his choice, “that attorney must then be content to be compensated in line with other local attorneys practicing in the field.” (Slip Opn., p. 7.)
Acting P.J. Justice Bedsworth penned the 3-0 decision, sustaining the fee award.