Unlike Other Fee Areas, Brown Act Fee Award Must Specifically Set Forth Predicate Findings.
We learn something just about every day by blogging. California’s Brown Act—designed to promote governmental transparency through opening meeting protections—does have a fee-shifting clause in Government Code section 549605.5, which allows an award of fees and costs where defendant has prevailed in a final determination and the court finds the action was clearly frivolous and totally lacking in merit. Interestingly enough, case law has established because such an award is akin to a sanction, it is necessary for the trial judge to specify the factors which led to a conclusion that the action was frivolous/lacking in merit. (Boyle v. City of Redondo Beach, 70 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1121 (1999).) Most times, a fee award does not have to be supported by a statement of decision, although there are exceptions.
In Olson v. Hornbook Community Services Dist., Case No. C084494 et al. (3d Dist. March 25, 2019) (partially published; fee discussion not published), plaintiffs did suffer judgments of dismissal in favor of District in several Brown Act cases, with the trial judge awarding it fees and costs under section 549605.5. However, because the ultimate order doing so was void (it was a subsequent, impermissible correction of judicial error) and failed to specify the bases for a costs/fee award, it had to be reversed.