Although Plaintiff Prevailed On The Unlawful Detainer Claim, Defendant Obtained Greater Relief, And The Parties’ Contract Fees Provision Encompassed Both Contract And Tort Causes Of Action.
We previously discussed a prior appeal from this next case, which stemmed from a landlord/tenant dispute over the use of six parking spaces, in our May 23, 2018 post. In the earlier appeal, the trial court – based on its determination there was no “prevailing party” for purposes of Code Civ. Proc., § 1032 costs – determined that defendant was not the “prevailing party” for fees under Civil Code § 1717. The 2/5 DCA reversed and remanded for determination under § 1717 – reasoning that the “prevailing party” determinations under Civil Code § 1717 and Code Civ. Proc., § 1032 are distinct such that a routine costs “prevailing party” determination does not resolve a § 1717 “prevailing party” determination.
On remand, in AAWestwood v. Liberal Arts 667 etc., Case No. B296066 (2d Dist., Div. 5 November 13, 2020) (unpublished), the trial court determined that defendant was the prevailing party on the contract, and awarded defendant $225,000 in trial attorney fees plus an additional $55,000 in appellate attorney fees.
Plaintiff appealed, but the 2/5 DCA affirmed.
First, plaintiff’s argument that it was entitled on remand to have the same trial judge who presided over the initial fees proceedings was not supported with relevant authority. Although the hearing on remand was held before a different judge, because the originally presiding trial judge had been reassigned to a different department, “[t]he cause [was] before the court, not the individual judge of that court, and the jurisdiction which the judge exercises is the jurisdiction of the court, not of the judge.” (People v. Osslo, 50 Cal.2d 75, 104 (1958).) (See also, In re Marriage of Regnery, 214 Cal.App.3d 1367, 1377 (1989) and Leonard Carder, LLP v. Patten, Faith & Sandford, 189 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 (2010).)
Second, plaintiff’s contention that defendant was not entitled to section 1717 fees because defendant had only prevailed on equitable (quiet title and declaratory relief) causes of action, while plaintiff prevailed on its unlawful detainer cause of action, was without merit. Section 1717’s relief is not limited to breach of contract claims. The attorney fees provision of the parties’ 2009 Lease provided for the prevailing party’s recovery of reasonable attorney fees in an action to enforce the terms of the Lease or declare rights thereunder. (Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal. 4th 599, 608 (1998) (No. 6 of our Leading Cases) [broadly phrased fees provision may support an award of fees to the prevailing party on both contract and tort claims].) There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that defendant had obtained greater relief and was thus entitled to § 1717 prevailing party fees.
As to the trial court’s award of appellate attorney fees, the trial court properly concluded that defendant had prevailed on the earlier appeal and was therefore entitled to recover attorney fees.
Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s calculation of the amount of fees. Detailed time records were not required as the trial court’s calculation, which included a reduction for certain requested fees, was supported by the trial court’s review of the case file and consideration of declarations and arguments by both parties. (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin, 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698 (2014).)